While most demographic fertility studies focus on child birth behavior of females, little is known about differences between males and females fertility behavior. The lack of empirical research about men stems from problems such as linking fathers and their biological offspring, biological differences in male reproductive behavior as compared to women, missing data and concerns about the quality of existing data sources. Using the data from the Russian Generation and Gender Survey (2004) 
Introduction
Long-term fertility research in demography has mainly focused on fertility dynamics and behavior of women. An important reason for this focus was the direct link between women and their children. When family and parenthood were lifelong stable institutions, the analyses of female fertility patterns alluded to an almost complete picture of fertility dynamics. However, today's family and parenthood are more dynamic and multifarious. During the last decades, patterns like stepfamilies, social parenthood, and patchwork families have gained more importance in modern societies. Recent research has shown that the inclusion of men and/or fathers leads to better understanding of fertility and family dynamics (Goldscheider and Kaufman
1996; Greene and Biddlecom 2000).
Demographic studies assume that male fertility behavior is different from its female counterpart in many ways: Men presumably have a longer reproductive life span, men tend to start their fertility career later than do women, the variety of the number of biological children born to men is assumingly larger compared to that of women and men tend to underreport their fertility outcomes. These aspects are rather neglected in empirical demographic research and are often considered obstacles to incorporating men in fertility and family demography. By using the case of Russia, I will investigate the differences between male and female fertility patterns in terms of age, timing, parity and childlessness. This analysis is driven by two goals: Firstly, to compare the fertility age, timing and parity pattern of men and women and secondly, to check the reliability of Russian male fertility reports compared to women's. Thereby, it will be shown that the sex specific differences of fertility outcomes, fertility pattern and fertility reporting behavior, as assumed in demographic literature, contain only minor empirical evidence.
Men's and women's fertility patterns will be examined using data from the Russian Generation and Gender Survey (GGS) of 2004. Even if Russia is a very specific example with various country-specific demographic developments, the collected data offer an excellent possibility for sex-specific comparisons and can be used as a starting point for future fertility research on Russia with data from the GGS. The separate collection of male and female fertility histories allows a detailed analysis of age patterns, parity distributions and birth transitions of men and women. Thereby, female fertility patterns will be used as a benchmark, since they are assumed to be unbiased.
In the following, the term Russia refers to the territory of the Russian Federation. The term Russians (Russian men or women) is used for inhabitants of this area. If
Russians as an ethnic group are specified, the term "ethnic Russians" will be used.
The country-specific context of Russia since the 1990s was and is shaped by dramatic changes in political, social and economic conditions. Their impact on fertility is not discussed in this study, since the aim is merely descriptive.
Problems and concerns when incorporating men into demographic fertility research
Since the interest among demographers and sociologists in men, their reproductive life cycle and fertility behavior is growing, barriers to incorporate males in fertility and family research are discussed. The discussion is based on the fact that it is more difficult to establish a direct link between a biological child and his father, compared to females and their offspring. This issue is often treated as a main obstacle to conducting reliable analyses and data about male fertility. In the following, social arguments and methodological issues of this debate are briefly discussed.
Social arguments: An important argument for relying on female fertility data only was the fact that marriage and the family were lifelong stable institutions in the industrialized world during a major part of the 20 th century. In this "golden age of marriage," births out of wedlock, stepfamily pattern or single parenthood were minor phenomena (van de Kaa 1987 However, other studies conclude that it is possible to obtain correct fertility data from men (Duberstein Lindberg et al. 1998b; Mott and Gryn 2001) .
In the following, hypotheses concerning sex-specific fertility characteristics will be described and the mentioned problems will be discussed in detail. This is followed by a short description of the dataset, variables and methods used. The empirical analyses will be presented subsequently. Firstly, I show descriptive aggregated fertility measures for both sexes. The second part will contain event history analysis of the transition to the first, second and third birth. All transitions will be modeled separately for both sexes. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the results and the stated hypothesis. Analyses of the sex-specific differences in fertility behavior are even rarer than research on male fertility or fatherhood. I refer to the discussion of four sex-specific differences:
1. The evaluation of this hypothesis appears trivial. Nevertheless, it has important methodological and theoretical implications. Men and women of the same age are not equally fertile (especially not during their teenage years). Males and females do not have the same age-specific probability of finding a partner or becoming parents.
Changing fertility-relevant societal conditions (e.g. social policies etc.) would affect men and women at different ages. Hence, when comparing cohort-specific fertility measures, the common age difference should be taken into account. Males should be related to two or three year younger females and vice versa.
My second hypothesis is that the sex-specific age difference between Russian men and women at the birth of their first biological child is around two years. Men are assumed to be two years older than their female counterparts ("age gap" hypothesis).
This pattern has already been shown for Russian marriage behavior. My third hypothesis therefore is that a polarization of progeny size among Russian men should be observable. A larger number of men (compared to women) will stay childless, whereas some males reproduce more often compared to their female counterparts ("polarization" hypothesis).
4. Misreporting and underreporting of male fertility is probably the most important topic when examining male fertility behavior. Most of the studies about male fertility stress that men underreport their fertility, even if they are interviewed directly My fourth hypothesis is that only minor differences between female and male fertility reports occur if the structure of the questionnaire (which will be discussed in the following) accounts for these issues ("no underreporting" hypothesis). However, to estimate the completeness of a male's fertility, two key assumptions are necessary: 1.
The total number of births of men and women from the same population should be equal, when averaged over a suitable time interval and over the same birth cohorts, if the sex ratio is not completely unbalanced. 2. Women's fertility reports are correct and complete (Rendall et al. 1999 ). The collection of fertility and partnership histories was one of the most important issues of the GGS program. Therefore, two kinds of fertility tables were conducted: 1) children in the household and 2) children currently not in the household. All children were distinguished in respect to their relation to the respondent (biological, fostered, In the first part of the empirical analyses, I examine my hypotheses by using fertility aggregated statistics. Period and cohort measures are presented. Some of them are taken from official statistics (e.g. Council of Europe). Since most of the official statistics do not contain fertility information concerning males, self-estimated aggregate statistics will be presented, too.
Data and Methods

Data
In the next step, hazard regression models are displayed to crosscheck age and parityspecific fertility patterns. First, survival curves will be presented. In the last part, the corresponding piece-wise constant baseline intensities, interacted with sex and controlled for region of residence, are shown. The parity specific models can be written as: Table 5 ) which is interacted with sex of the respondent. Region of residence (c i ) is introduced as a time constant covariate.
Empirical Analyses
Sex differences in aggregated measures
In Figure 1 the female estimates are much higher. I argue that it could be due to an overrepresentation of highly fertile young women in the sample. As a previous survey study by Kreyenfeld (2002) for Germany showed, they are more often at home and consequently easier to reach by the interviewers.
However, even if the trends in the presented measures are similar, using the TFR only is an incomplete proof of sex differences and the reliability of the data, since it is very sensible to timing effects and is not showing cohort specific patterns.
The cohort specific analyses will focus on the birth cohorts up to 1970. women was estimated by using the GGS (for detailed description of the distribution of respondents by birth cohorts and parity, see Appendix: Table 2 and Table 3 ).
The corresponding graphs in Figure single-year birth cohorts, the respondents were grouped in five-year cohort intervals (for distribution of respondents, see Appendix: Table 4 ). The sex difference is smaller than in Figure 2 and less variation occurs in the graphs. However, the patterns are similar. to 1968 (not biased by WWII), the overall difference is 2.6 percent. The stable level of reported childlessness and the small sex differences support the assumption that the Russian GGS provides estimates of good quality for male fertility compared to previously discussed studies and used samples (Toulemon 2001; Rendall 1999 ).
Furthermore, parity-specific distributions of Russian men and women for different birth cohorts are estimated ( Figure 5 and Figure 6 ) to examine whether a higher proportion of men are fathering a large number of biological children. In spite of differences in the two youngest cohort groups (again, biased by the WWII), the distribution over the births cohorts of childless men and women on the one side and fathers and mothers with more than three children on the other side is very similar.
The two-child family dominates Russian society in all birth cohorts and the number of individuals with more than three biological children is constantly declining from the oldest to the youngest cohorts, whereas the proportion of one-child families is increasing. There is no evidence for a polarization effect that more males than females have three or more biological children.
In the next section, sex-specific age characteristics are examined. In Figure 7 the median age at first birth, estimated from the Russian GSS, and the sex-specific differences for different calendar years (five-year groups) are presented.
Throughout the 1950s and up to the mid 1960s, the age at first birth was relatively increased. This was mainly due to an increased age among Russian men at the first birth of their children, whereas a female's age at first childbirth stayed stable. In the new millennium, the age gap has decreased again. Generally, the sex-specific age difference over all periods is very stable. It ranges around two years i.e. Russian men are usually two years older than women when becoming a parent.
Whereas the small age differences and the low age at childbirth of males after WWII could be mainly explained by an unbalanced sex ratio, the explanation of the occurring differences in the 1990s most probably needs a more detailed analysis of factors on the individual, as well as societal, level.
The age differences between Russian males and females, from the cohort perspective, are displayed in Figure 8 . They are similar to the previous results. Men's median age at fist birth stayed very stable over all birth cohorts (1920s, 1930s: app. 26; 1950s, 1960s, 1970s : app. 24) but it declined two years in the cohorts of the 1940s.
Oppositely,, women's age at first birth constantly declined, with the exception of in the 1940s, where it slightly increased. The average age distance between the sexes over the birth cohorts from 1936 to 1970 was 2.14 years, i.e. on average men were 2.14 years older than their female counterparts. However, in the oldest cohort group men were younger than women at their transition to parenthood, due to the imbalance in the partner market after WWII. The increase of the age gap between Russian males and females in the birth cohorts around 1940 is explained by the large male birth cohorts of the years around 1940. In Table 1, the 10 th percentile of the age at first birth, the 90 th percentile of the age at last birth and the distance between both estimates are displayed. It shows that Russian men are reproducing at older ages and for a longer period of time than are females, with the exception of the two oldest cohort groups and the birth cohorts around 1945.
Again, these exceptions are related to the described effects of WWII. Similar to the age at first birth, the upper age border decreased over the cohorts for both sexes. For 90 percent of female and male respondents from the birth cohorts between 1926 and 1965, the age at last birth did not exceed 45 years.
Sex differences in parity-specific transition models
In Figure 9 , Kaplan-Meier survival functions for the transition to the first birth are In Figure 10 , the survival curves for the transitions to the second birth are presented.
No remarkable sex-specific differences occur. Sixty-nine percent of all Russian onechild fathers and 68 percent of all Russian one-child mothers from the birth cohorts between 1936 and 1970 experience a second birth. The transition to the third birth ( Figure 11 ) also shows similar sex-specific patterns.
Seven years after the previous birth, the main transition phase to the third child is finished. This applies to Russian women as well as to Russian men. In comparison to the second birth, only a minority of all two-child parents have more children. Not even one third of all two-child parents experience subsequent births. This illustrates the strong dominance of the two-child family in Russia. Figure 11 also shows that more two-child mothers tend to have a third child in comparison to their male counterparts. In the birth cohorts between 1936 and 1970, the sex-specific difference is 1.5 percent (females: 22.9 %; males: 21.4 %).
The last two survival functions show that Russian men and women have very similar fertility timing patterns. Once they have started their reproductive career, nearly no differences occur. Moreover, there is no evidence for a male parity polarization pattern.
In Figure 12 , the baseline intensities for Russian men and women and their transition to the first child are presented. The process time is the age of the respondent, starting from age 12. The process ends at first birth and cases are censored at time of interview. The male transition phase starts approximately two years later compared to the female one. The risk of fist birth peaks for women between ages 20 and 24, whereas for men it is the highest between 22 and 28. Since the risk of a first birth declines afterwards to a value around zero at the age of 48 for males as well as for females, there is no evidence that men have remarkably higher risks of a first birth at older ages. Figure 13 shows the baseline intensity of the transition to the second birth by sex.
The process time is the age of the first child, ending at the second birth or at time of interview for censored cases. Only small sex-specific differences occur. It confirms that the fertility timing pattern of the second birth is nearly the same for Russian men and Russian women. The highest risk for a second birth is observable between 1 and 6 years after the first birth and it peaks when the first child reaches age 5. Afterwards, the risk constantly declines and reaches a level around zero 18 years after the previous birth. 
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This applies to women as well as to men. Consequently, the time frame when family extension usually occurs is more or less similar for both sexes.
The baseline function of the transition to the third birth is presented in Figure 14 . The age of the second child is used as the process time, which ends at the birth of the third child or at time of interview for censored cases. Again, the differences between the sexes are only minor. Timing pattern as well as the length of the time frame when a third birth most probably occurs is nearly the same for Russian men and women. The risk of a third birth peaks shortly (two to three years) after the previous birth and declines fast. This pattern is more pronounced for females then for males. However, 18 years after the birth of the second child, the propensity for a subsequent birth is close to zero for the sexes.
Discussion
The purpose of this paper was to evaluate the differences between Russian male and female fertility behavior in respect to four hypotheses. Although sex-specific differences are often viewed as problematic when analyzing male fertility, it was shown that these differences are much weaker than other demographic studies suggested. Data of the Russian GGS (2004) were used to conduct aggregated fertility measures, survival functions and hazard regression models for men and women.
1. "fertile time span" hypothesis: Neither the evaluation of the aggregate statistics, nor the transition to the first, the second and the third birth allude to the assumption that Russian men have a much longer reproductive life span in comparison to their female counterparts, even if men have the biological ability to become fathers at older ages. Consequently, the age in which the fertility of Russian males is completed is not different from women's age. It is reasonable to assume that both sexes finished their reproductive career at age 49 or even earlier (see Table 1 ).
This pattern should be related to two issues. First, it was shown that male fertility pattern in Russia, most of the time, was characterized by a start of the birth career at early ages, short birth intervals as well as an early finish. Secondly, the strong dominance of the two-child family in Russia further adds to the explanation. Russian fertility behavior may be described with four words "Everybody, Early, Few and Quickly." (Avdeev 2001: 9) These patterns can be explained by very stable country-specific family formation characteristics and homogenous reproductive behavior: 1. Relatively early marriage and the first birth are closely connected. 2. The desirable number of children has been and still is stable at a level around two in the last 60 years. 3. The family formation (1 st child) is quickly completed, with short spacing between marriage and first birth and between the subsequent births (Zakharov 1997; Zakharov 1999) . So far such patterns have only been described for Russian females. However, they are similarly applicable to men. 
